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Abstract—This paper presents a game theoretic model aimed 
at optimizing the performance of medium access control in 
ad-hoc wireless networks. IEEE 802.11 is the commonly used 
protocol in such networks, so our model is specifically tailored 
for it. The network of wireless nodes is abstracted into a 
community of selfish users playing a non-cooperative game. The 
resource they vie for is the common random-access wireless 
channel. We define new utility functions for the nodes and show 
that these utility functions have insightful and elegant 
mathematical properties to steer the game to a unique 
non-trivial Nash equilibrium. This defines a stable operating 
point from which no player has an incentive to deviate 
unilaterally. At this stable point each node has an equal 
non-trivial share of the common wireless transmission channel. 
Thus selfish behavior of the nodes is used as a mechanism to 
enforce desirable properties of the network as a whole. 
Simulations show that this design scores over the traditional 
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) in IEEE 802.11 MAC 
in terms of throughput and collision overhead, thus greatly 
improving the system-wide MAC layer performance of the 
network. Since the utility functions produce high performance 
objectives over a wide range of network sizes in a completely 
distributed fashion with the nodes behaving selfishly, a 
self-enforcing mechanism for efficient working of ad-hoc and 
large unattended networks of constrained wireless devices is 
achieved. 
 
Index Terms—Ad-hoc Wireless Networks, Game Theory, 
Nash Equilibrium, IEEE 802.11, Throughput 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
  In most wireless networks, including ad-hoc and sensor 
networks, access to the shared wireless medium is 
random-access based. In absence of a central regulating 
authority, it is only natural that multiple wireless nodes will 
attempt to access the medium simultaneously, resulting in 
packet collisions. IEEE 802.11 (hereafter briefly called 
802.11) is the most commonly followed standard in wireless 
networks. It defines a distributed mechanism  called the 
distributed coordination        function (DCF)           to resolve 
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contention among the contending nodes. It involves channel 
sensing to assess the state of the network and adjusting the 
channel access probability accordingly to minimize chances 
of collision. 
 
In 802.11, the channel access probability is determined by 
a contention window (CW) maintained by a node. DCF uses a 
binary feedback signal (collision or no collision) and sharply 
updates CW using binary exponential backoff to adapt to the 
contention. 
However, various studies [3], [7], [8], [10] report that this 
contention control scheme results in drastic reduction in 
throughput with increasing number of contending nodes. 
Every new transmission begins with the same channel access 
probability and thus the history of contention level in the 
network is not used. Moreover, doubling the contention 
window for every failed transmission only reduces the 
chances of transmission by the nodes that were already 
unsuccessful. 
These inferences indicate that instead of using drastic 
update strategies, it is better to steadily guide the system to a 
state that is optimal with respect to the current contention 
level in the network. Since this state is optimal, it is 
sustainable and has high throughput, greater fairness and 
sparing collisions. 
This requires an analytical framework where these 
desirable features can be mathematically characterized. 
Towards this end, we model the nodes as selfish players in 
a non-cooperative game [4]. Unlike common studies [2], 
[11], we do not reverse-engineer DCF as a game but use 
game theory as a tool for optimization. We define utility 
functions reflecting the gain from channel access and the loss 
from collision. The strategy set of each node is the set of 
allowable channel access probabilities of the node. We next 
propose gentle update strategies that drive the network to its 
Nash equilibrium from which no player has an incentive to 
unilaterally deviate. This characterizes the desired stable 
operating point or the optimal state of the network. A 
continuous feedback signal is used to assess the contention 
level. 
The main contribution of this work is to propose new 
utility functions that allow a large range of channel access 
probabilities (thus ensuring good performance in a wide 
spectrum of network sizes) and result in a unique non-trivial 
Nash equilibrium. Non-triviality and uniqueness ensure that 
the equilibrium is efficient and leads to high short-term 
fairness. As we show through extensive simulations, the 
resulting design is able to provide far better results than DCF 
used in 802.11.  Throughput gets higher, and collision 
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overhead and time slots wasted in collisions are drastically 
reduced in the new design. The nodes do not need to know 
the total number of nodes in the network nor is any message 
passing necessary. A completely distributed mechanism that 
allows each node to behave selfishly to maximize its own 
payoff is used to ensure a socially beneficial state.    
The remaining part of the paper is as follows: Section II 
provides a background of this study, journeying through the 
recent past of game-theoretic models in communication 
systems, especially medium access control in networks. We 
also point out the differentiation and novelty of our work as 
regards related studies in the literature. Section III presents 
the proposed game model and its many properties. Section IV 
investigates distributed mechanisms to achieve the 
equilibrium of the game in real networks. The model is 
evaluated via simulations in section V. After a brief 
discussion in section VI conclusions follow in section VII. 
 
II. THE  BACKGROUND 
Game theory [4] provides a tool to study situations in which 
there is a set of rational decision makers who take specific 
actions that have mutual, possibly conflicting, consequences. 
A game models an interaction among parties (called the 
players) who are rational decision makers and have possibly 
conflicting objectives. Each player has a set of actions called 
its strategies and with each strategy is associated a payoff 
function. Rationality demands each player maximize its own 
payoff function. Non-cooperative games are commonly used 
to model problems in medium access control in 
telecommunication networks. In such a game, the solution 
concept is a notion called a stable set or Nash Equilibrium 
that identifies a set of strategies for all the participating 
players, from which no player has an incentive to unilaterally 
deviate as any unilateral deviation will not result in an 
increase in payoff of the deviating player. 
In [1] the authors model the nodes in an Aloha network as 
selfish players in a non-cooperative Aloha game. They 
assume that the number of backlogged users is always 
globally known. This limitation is addressed in [6] where 
only the total number of users is known. More recent research 
includes modeling the DCF in 802.11 in a game-theoretic 
framework [11], and reverse engineering exponential backoff 
as a strategy [2].  
In contradistinction to these works, we do not explicitly 
reverse-engineer 802.11 or DCF into a game model but use 
ideas from non-cooperative game theory to optimize the 
performance of 802.11. We consider each node in a wireless 
network as having a set of strategies which are its channel 
access probabilities. Unlike common practices in 
optimization of 802.11 like [3], we do not assume that each 
node knows the number of users in the network. This is more 
reflective of practical situations where such knowledge is 
difficult to acquire. Non game-theoretic approaches that do 
not depend on the nodes' knowing the network size include 
the ones presented in [7] and [10]. We use selfishness to 
achieve optimized system-wide performance. Related work 
also includes [9] where the authors use game theory to study 
and optimize 802.11. But their illustrative utility functions 
are different from ours. Their utility functions are 
well-behaved in a much more restricted domain than ours. 
Moreover, as we show, our utility functions give far better 
results for large network sizes.  
III. THE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF MEDIUM ACCESS 
CONTROL 
The system we consider is a network of N nodes that are all 
able to hear one another. To facilitate analysis we will adopt a 
description of our access mechanism in terms of channel 
access probabilities. It has been shown in [8] that in a 
saturated regime the constant channel access probability p 
relates to the corresponding contention window cw according 
to: 
1
2
+
=
cw
p
                                                                …(1) 
Now we turn to the game model. We define the game G as 
a 3-tuple G = <N, {Si}i ∊  N, {ui}i ∊  N>, where N is a set of 
players (wireless nodes), player i ∊  N, each player having a 
strategy set Si = {pi |pi ∊  [vi, wi]} with 0 < vi < wi < 1 and 
payoff function ui. The strategy set of each player is the set of 
its channel access probabilities. Note that it is a 
generalization to a continuous space of the simpler strategy 
set {wait, transmit} denoting the two deterministic actions 
that a node can perform. The payoff is naturally of the form:  
ui = Ui(pi) – piqi(p). Here Ui(pi) is the utility function 
denoting the gain from channel access and  qi(p) is the 
conditional collision probability given by 
            ∏
− ∈
− − =
} {
) 1 ( 1 ) (
i N j
j i p q p                               …(2) 
Thus piqi(p) is the cost of channel access. 
We propose a novel utility function: 
i
i i i
i i r
p w p
p U
ln
) 1 ln (ln
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+ −
=
               …(3) 
where pi = channel access probability (0 < vi ≤ pi ≤ wi < 1),  ri 
= wi / vi > 1.  
In non-cooperative games, the final outcome is described 
by investigating its Nash Equilibrium. Denote the strategy 
profile of all nodes by p = (p1, p2, ..., pi, ..., pn) and the 
strategy profile of all nodes but i by p-i = (p1, p2, ..., pi-1, pi+1, 
..., pn). Then the Nash Equilibrium (NE) is defined as the 
strategy profile p* =(p1*,  p2*, ..., pi*, ... pn*) with the 
property that for every player i and every strategy pi of player 
i, ui(pi*, p-i*)  ≥  ui(pi, p-i*). So no player gains by unilaterally 
changing its strategy. 
Note in passing that our utility function does not 
correspond to a physical quantity like throughput, delay, or 
the like but is a mathematical expression formulated to satisfy 
the desirable property of unique non-trivial NE of the game. 
The rest of the paper proves these characteristics and shows 
that it leads to performance far superior to DCF in contention 
control. 
 
Theorem 1: The game G has a NE.  
Proof: The strategy space Si = [vi, wi] (0 < vi < wi < 1) of each 
player is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of   
Euclidean space.   Further, ui is continuous. Since  
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and pi ￿ Si,  ui is quasi-concave in pi. Hence the game has an 
NE [4]. 
An NE is non-trivial if the following condition holds 
*) ( ) (
* ' p i i i q p U =                                 ...(4) 
and trivial otherwise.   
 
Theorem 2: The game G has non-trivial NE. 
Proof: From (2), qi(p) maps any p ￿ S1 x S2 x ... x Sn into a 
point in [0,1]. Now from the definition of non-trivial NE as 
given in (4) above,  *) (
* p i i f p =  =  *)) ( ( ) (
1 ' p i i q U
− . 
Since              
i
i
i
i i r
p
w
p U
ln
) ln(
) (
' =                            ...(5) 
1-1 in Si ,the inverse function 
i q
i i i i r w q U
− − = ) ( ) (
1 '   exists, which is continuous and 
decreasing in qi.  Also, 
i i w U =
− ) 0 ( ) (
1 '
 and 
i i v U =
− ) 1 ( ) (
1 '
.  
Thus, qi(p) maps any qi ￿ [0, 1] into a point in [vi, wi]. Hence 
the vector function f(p) = (f1(p), f2(p), ... , f|N|(p)) maps the set 
Xi￿NSi into itself. Hence, by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, 
there is a fixed point of f in Xi￿NSi. At this fixed point, the 
condition (4) holds. In other words, G has a non-trivial NE. 
The existence of non-trivial NE signifies that the channel 
access probability of any node in NE is not at the boundary of 
strategy space. This reduces unfair sharing of the wireless 
channel among the contending nodes, thus preventing the 
highly undesirable 'tragedy of commons'. 
 
Theorem 3: The NE is unique for all pi in [vi, wi] for all i ∊  N   
if  
1
1
−
>
i w
i
i
e
w
v  . 
Proof:  First consider the function 
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differentiating with respect to pi, 
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the rest of the proof, assume the above relation between vi 
and wi holds.  Also by (4) at non-trivial NE, for node i, 
∏
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making φi(pi) identical for all nodes i.  
Now assume for the sake of contradiction that there exist at 
least two distinct non-trivial NE x* and y* of the game G. Let 
φi(xi
*) = σ1 and φi(yi
*) = σ2 for some node i. Since φi is strictly 
increasing, σ1 ≠ σ2. Assume without loss in generality, σ1 > σ2. 
Then, xi
* > yi
*
 for all i ￿ N. By (4) and since qi(p) is increasing 
in p, Ui
'(xi*) = qi(x*) > qi(y*) = Ui
'(yi
*). But Ui
’’(pi) = -1/(pi ln 
ri) showing that Ui
’(pi) is decreasing, thus a contradiction. 
Hence x* = y* proving the uniqueness of the NE. 
 
 
Theorem 4: Suppose all the players in G  have identical 
strategy sets. Then at the unique non-trivial NE of G, all the 
players choose the same strategies. 
 
Proof: Since all players have the same strategy sets, for any 
two players i and j, wi = wj and vi = vj. Now suppose that the 
unique non-trivial NE is p*. Let there exist pi* and pj* in p* 
corresponding to nodes i and j such that pi* ≠ pj*. Denote the 
set of strategies in some order of all nodes except i and j at 
NE as p-ij* so that the NE can be described as an ordered set 
(p-ij*, pi*, pj*). Then interchanging the strategies of nodes i 
and j at NE results in a new NE given by the ordered set (p-ij*, 
pj*, pi*). Since by theorem 2, none of the elements of p* is 
zero, it contradicts the uniqueness of the NE, violating 
theorem 3.   Hence, pi* = pj*. i and j being arbitrary, it follows 
that pi* = pj* for all  i, j ￿ N. 
 
This has a very important and useful consequence: the 
wireless channel is accessed by the nodes with identical 
access probabilities at the equilibrium point thus resulting in 
fair sharing of the resource among the contenders, and 
consequently short-term fairness. 
IV. DISTRIBUTED MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM 
In our design the non-cooperative game G is played 
repeatedly by the nodes, that is, it is a multi-stage game. A 
stage may be a single transmission or a sequence of K 
transmissions for a fixed K > 1. 
Suppose that each node after playing a round observes the 
cumulative effect (in the sense of conditional collision 
probability) of the actions of all players in the previous 
round. This knowledge may now be used by the node to 
select its strategy for the next round. Based on how this 
knowledge is used, there are many common techniques to 
push the system to its Nash equilibrium. Two more popular 
ones are: 
 
 
 Best Response: This is the most obvious mechanism 
where at each stage every player chooses the strategy that 
maximizes its payoff given the actions of all the other players 
in the previous round: 
))) ( ( ) ( ) ( ( ( max arg ) 1 (
] , [ ) (
t q t p t p U t p i i i i
w v t p
i
i i i
p − = +
∈  
for each node  N i∈ . 
 
 
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 2008 Vol I
WCE 2008, July 2 - 4, 2008, London, U.K.
ISBN:978-988-98671-9-5 WCE 2008 
 
    Gradient Play: In this case, each player adjusts its 
persistence probability gradually in a gradient direction 
suggested by the observations of the effect of other players’ 
actions. Mathematically, 
  ))) ( ( ) ( ( ))( ( ( ) ( ) 1 (
' t q t p U t p f t p t p i i i i i i i p − + = +  
 
for each node  N i∈  where  step  size  0 (.) > i f can be a 
function of the strategy of player i . It has a intuitively 
appealing interpretation: if at any stage of the game, the 
marginal utility Ui
’(pi(t)) exceeds the “price of contention” 
qi(p(t)), the persistence probability is increased, but if the 
price is greater, the persistence probability is reduced. For 
convergence of these mechanisms in a more generic setting, 
see [5], [9]. 
To eliminate the need to know the current strategies of all 
other players, a node needs to estimate qi(p) in an indirect 
way. A simple method is to track the number of packet 
transmissions (nt) and the number of packet losses (nl) over a 
period of time and calculate qi = nl/nt. A more sophisticated 
approach [10] involves observing the number of idle slots 
which follows a geometric distribution with mean I = p
idle / 
(1-p
idle) where p
idle = probability of a slot being idle = 
) 1 ( ∏
∈
−
N i
i p . Thus by observing I, qi can be estimated as: 
i
i p
I
I
q
−
+
− =
1
) 1 (
1
, allowing a completely distributed 
update mechanism. 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we perform extensive numerical 
simulations to analyze our model. The simulation results are 
obtained in a saturation regime. The performance is 
compared with the standard DCF in basic access 802.11b. 
We choose to measure the channel access probabilities, 
aggregate throughput of all nodes, collision overhead 
incurred and the average number of time slots wasted in 
collisions per successful transmission 
The saturation throughout Si of a node i in an 802.11 
network is given by the following expression in Bianchi’s 
model [8]: 
col col suc suc
i
trans idle
trans suc
i
i p p p p
p p
S
τ τ σ + +
℘
=
 
where ℘ = packet payload (assumed constant), 
trans p = 
probability of a transmission by any node = 
) 1 ( 1 ∏
∈
− −
N i
i p , 
suc
i p  = conditional success probability of 
node i = probability of a successful transmission by the node 
given that there is a transmission = 
tr
i
i N i
i
p
p p ) 1 (
} {
− ∏
− ∈
, 
idle p = probability of a slot being idle =  ) 1 ( ∏
∈
−
N i
i p , 
∑
∈
− − =
N i
suc
i
idle col p p p 1
, σ is the slot time, τ
suc  is the 
average duration of a slot in which a successful transmission 
occurs and τ
col  is the average duration of a slot in which a 
collision occurs. 
In our experiments, the slot time is 20 us, SIFS = 10 μs, 
DIFS = 20 μs, basic rate = 1 Mbps, data rate = 11 Mbps, 
propagation delay = 1 μs, PHY header = 24 bytes, MAC 
header = 34 bytes, ACK = 14 bytes and the packet payload is 
fixed at 1500 bytes. We assume all nodes use the same 
parameters for the utility function. To compare with DCF, we 
set bounds of the contention window to powers of 2 
(specifically 32 and 1024) and derive the bounds of the 
strategy sets using (1). This gives wi = 2/33 = 0.06061 and vi 
= 2/1025 = 0.00195. Note that in this range the condition of 
theorem 3 is satisfied since 
1
1
−
>
i w
i
i
e
w
v ≈ 1 x 10
-8. In the 
following subsections, we call our game-theoretic distributed 
coordination function GDCF. 
 
A. Channel  Access  Probabilities 
Figure 1 shows the variation of the probability with which a 
node accesses the wireless channel in the saturation regime in 
GDCF and DCF as the network size increases.  In both 
protocols, the domain of the probability is the set [0.06061, 
0.00195] since contention window varies from 32 to 1024.  
Recollect from section III that the probability with which any 
given node in GDCF accesses the channel at the NE is 
identical for all nodes. We observe that the channel access 
probabilities are always observed to be higher in DCF than in 
GDCF. This has an important consequence as will be evident 
in the ensuing discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Aggregate  Throughput 
The aggregate throughput (see figure 2) which measures 
the total throughput of all nodes under saturation conditions 
is higher in DCF when the network size is small but it gets far 
lower than GDCF as the network size grows. This is because 
the channel access probabilities are higher in DCF. In a small 
Fig. 1: Network size vs. channel access 
probabilities 
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network, collisions are few and so higher channel access 
probabilities translate to higher throughput. But as network 
size grows, collisions increase if all nodes aggressively 
access the channel, triggering a drastic reduction in 
throughput. Since channel access probabilities are lower in 
GDCF, it supersedes DCF as network size grows. 
Consequently, large beds of wireless nodes achieve much 
greater throughput if they run GDCF instead of DCF. 
 
C. Collision  Overhead 
We observe from figure 3 that the conditional collision 
probability is higher in case of DCF than in GDCF. This is 
expected as the channel access probabilities are lower in case 
of GDCF resulting in reduced medium contention even when 
the number of nodes increases. Indeed GDCF is designed 
with the aim of keeping the “price of contention” low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.  Slots Wasted in Collisions 
In 802.11, a large number of slots are wasted due to 
collisions. This seriously affects the performance and 
lifetime of the power-constrained devices in ad-hoc and 
sensor networks. Figure 4 makes clear that the number of 
slots wasted in collisions for every successful transmission is 
much higher in DCF than in GDCF, making the later 
attractive in these networks. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The motivation for this work is [9]. So we make a brief 
comparison with it in this section. 
Our utility function produces unique non-trivial NE for a 
wide range of vi and wi  while the one in [9] has strict 
constraints on vi once wi is specified. This makes our utility 
functions admit a much larger game space and hence is 
superior for widely varying network sizes since the channel 
access probability should be very small for very large 
network sizes and high for small network sizes. In our 
experiments, we vary contention windows from 32 to 1024 as 
is the default for DSSS PHY in 802.11 standard while in [9] 
(call it U_9) the window ceiling is limited to 256 if the base is 
32 and only powers of 2 are chosen. Our utility function 
exhibit particularly good performance for large network 
sizes. A brief performance comparison as regards throughput 
and collision for large networks is provided in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of 
Nodes 
Throughput Conditional  Collision 
Probability 
  GDCF U_9  GDCF U_9 
80  5.26 5.13  0.48 0.56 
90  5.15 4.93  0.55 0.59 
100  5.06 4.73  0.57 0.63 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The paper proposed a novel and elegant game-theoretic 
model aimed at optimizing the aggregate throughput and 
distributing it fairly among the contending nodes in an 
802.11 network, thus inducing a desirable state of the entire 
network. It also drastically brings down the collision 
overhead, reducing energy loss due to failed transmissions. 
We believe it contends as a serious and superior alternative to 
the traditional distributed coordination function in 802.11 
MAC. Our game-theoretic model uses selfish behavior of the 
Fig. 4: Number of slots wasted in collisions per 
successful packet transmission 
Fig. 3: Variation of conditional collision 
probabilities with network size  
Fig. 2: Variation of aggregate throughput with
network size 
Table 1: Brief comparison of utility functions 
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 2008 Vol I
WCE 2008, July 2 - 4, 2008, London, U.K.
ISBN:978-988-98671-9-5 WCE 2008 
 
participating players to steer the network to desirable 
system-wide characteristics. The presence of Nash 
equilibrium signifies a stable operating point from which no 
player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate while the 
unique, non-trivial nature of the equilibrium together with 
identical access probabilities for all nodes at the stable 
operating point assure fairly distributed throughput with low 
collision overhead. Rigorous analysis and simulations are 
used to prove the ideas. In future we intend to simulate the 
algorithm in settings with bit errors to gather more 
performance measures. Further, we intend to investigate 
other utility functions with similar characteristics and explore 
if this design can be used in cross layer optimization. 
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